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EXECUTORY DEVISES AND PERPETUITIES -
BROOKOVER v. GRIMM
The days when legal writing could safely be confined to purely
hypothetical discussion have long gone by. Lengthy dissertations
on such abstruse topics as the nature of possession' or the theory of
the old real actions2 are as obsolete as the escheat of corporation
personalty on corporate dissolntion3 Today, periodical literature
deals rather with questions of the living law, - even though these
do often seem as far-fetched as law school examination questions.
4
1E. g., SAViGNY, DAS REOHT DES BESITzES (7th ed. by Rudorff 1865);
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) Lecture VI.
2 3 BL. COMM. C. X.
I Fox v. Horah, 36 N. C. 358, 36 Am. Dec. 48 (1841).
4 Examples are Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99,
59 A. L. R. 1253 (1928), discussed by Green, The Palsgraf Case (1930) 30
COL. L. REv. 789; and Bell v. Wayne United Gas Co., 116 W. Va. 280, 181 S.
E. 609 (1935), commented upon in (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 168. Just as truth
is sometimes stranger than fiction, so these instances raise far more troubling
queries than the hypothetical difficulties set forth in law school questions (of
the problem type).
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Occasionally, modern case-law presents an instance where pure
legal theory and historical background combine to present the com-
pleted picture of existing law. The solution of the problem then
lies in understanding not only the needs of the present, but also the
inherited disposition of the courts to deal with the issues in the light
of precedents centuries old. Brookover v. Grimm," a recent West
Virginia case, illustrates these observations. Its facts involved the
transformation of an executory devise into a remainder with the
difficulty of postponed vesting in interest thrown in for good
measure. Its solution depended on the application of the Rule
against Perpetuities to the two possible constructions of these
future interests. But with the task of construing more or less even-
ly balanced, the traditional approach towards executory devises led
quickly to the result of their being held invalid. Legal history per-
haps unconsciously determined the technique of the court in reach-
ing the decision.
EXECUTORY DEVISES
In any survey of the perplexing subject of executory devises,
actually "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."0 For four
centuries, the common law refused absolutely to permit the limi-
tation of a future estate after conveyance in fee simple. Such "a
naughty remainder'' 7 would have been repugnant to the estate
originally conveyed: obviously, one fee could not be in remainder
to another.8 Analytically, it would be void, - not as a grant of a
remnant within Sir Edward Coke's definition, but as the creation
of an estate in derogation of a previous one.
Historically, the attempted creation of this shifting future
interest, - to A and his heirs, but if a contingency occurred, then
over to B and his heirs, - was seriously objectionable at one time,
socially and economically.9 A prior grantee of the fee could hardly
be expected to perform the feudal dues incident to his title, when,
on happening of the contingency, ownership might be transferred
over to the grantee under a subsequent limitation. Discipline in-
herent in medieval society was shaken, if willingness to perform
5118 W. Va. 227, 190 S. E. 697 (1937).
6 Per Holmes, J., in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 41 S.
Ct. 506, 65 L; Ed. 963 (1921).
7 Per Lord Nottingham, L. C., in The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas.
1,2 6 (1682).
8DIGBY, HISTORY OF THE LAw op REAL PRoPERTY (5th ed. 1897) 263-264;
Co. LITT. 143a.
9 KALEs, FuTURE INTERESTS 1n IINqOIS (2d ed. 1920) 26.
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onerous obligations and render loyalty to the over-lord were
jeopardized. Similarly, when a contingency could shift the fee
over to another, it might be expected that the first grantee or his
heirs would selfishly be inclined to continue on in possession, de-
fending the seisin. And if the other grantee sought to enforce his
right, disorder and strife would be engendered. Even the statute
of Richard II, could not suffice in these circumstances. 10 Hence,
no shifting executory devise of land devisable by custom was ever
held valid before the Statute of Wills.
"Yet the nature of things, and the necessity of commerce be-
tween man and man", "found a way to pass by that. rule, and that"
was "by way of use or by way of devise."' 1  Common law princi-
ples of seisin had never applied to the equitable estates known as
uses, in all the many decades of their enforcement by the chan-
cellor.' 2  So these shifting equitable estates were commonly met
with, and their validity by chancery writ assumed as of course. In
1536, the Statute of Uses' 3 converted into legal estates any shifting
uses; and four years later, the Statute of Wills 4 legalized the testa-
mentary practices of the period prior to the earlier enactment. Just
as before these statutes, the will had been regarded as a declaration
of the use in the land, effective on the testator's death but speaking
as from the date of the will, so the new statutory will operated as
a conveyance, dealing with the testator's legal interest at the date
of the will, but effective from his death only, and subject to revo-
cation theretofore."
Possibly to avert further destructive competition from the
equity side, common law courts soon fell into line and gave the
Statute of Uses and the Statute of Wills wide scope, without re-
strictive interpretation. Within a few years executory devises were
permitted to go unchallenged; in 1567, it is said, their validity at
law was expressly decided." One should not infer, however, the
new future interests were popular in the courts. On the contrary,
10 5 RICH. II, St. I, c. 8 (1382).
1 Per Lord Nottingham, The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Oh. Cas. 1, 26
(1682).
12 DIoBY, HISTORY OF THE LAW op REAL PRoPERTY 332-333.
'3 27 HEN. VMI, c. 10 (1536).
'4 32 HEN. VII, c. 1 (1540).
15 It followed from the original conception of a will, as a mode of raising a
use, that it could readily create interests arising at a future time (and divest-
ing previous interests), in a way unknown to the common law. See DIGBY, HIs-
TORY OF THE LAW op' REAL PROPERTY 381.
16 Odle's Case (1567), cited in Pells v. Brown, 2 Roll. R. 216, 220 (1620).
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---"these executory devises had not been long countenanced, when
the judges repented them.' 1 7  It was held "an inconvenience to
devise such a contingent estate."' 8  Still the incontrovertible fact-
remained: by the aid of shifting uses, the old learning as to the
nature of future estates in remainder had been circumvented.'
Conditional limitations became the accepted term for shifting uses
by deed and shifting executory devises :20 with their invention and
statutory recognition old common law restraints on the creation of
future interests vanished. There survived only a very real
prejudice in the courts against this type of estate. Future judges
were to formulate the rule against remoteness and their veto on
repugnant titles,2' in an unyielding effort to curb such use of con-
ditional limitations.
Present-day law assumes without question the executory devise
as an increasingly frequent type of future interest. To be sure,
opinion may occasionally differ in the attempt to distinguish it pre-
cisely from the modern contingent remainder, lately made in-
destructible by statute.2 2 With sharply-defined historial back-
ground, however, the shifting estate seldom presents now any un-
usual difficulties in construction of involved wills. Hence, Brook-
over v. Grimm2 s must be deemed a most important decision, both
by reason of the exhaustive discussion in the majority and dissent-
ing opinions, and because of the careful analysis of the limitations
contained in the will.
A testator devised land to his son-in-law for life,2 4 remainder
to an infant great-grandson in fee. Desiring to keep the property
17Per Treby, C. J., in Scattergood v. Edge, 12 Mod. 278, 287: "And if it
were to be done again, it would never prevail."
s18 Per Rolle, C. J., in Gay v. Gay, Styles 258, 274 (1651).
19 RALES, FUTURE INTERESTS i ILLINOIs 63.
20 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPLTUITIES (3d ed. 1915) 25.
21 As to the repugnancy of shifting uses by deed, see Palmer v. Cook, 159 Ill.
300, 42 N. E. 796, 50 Am. St. Rep. 165 (1896), as illustrative of the Illinois
common law doctrine. Cf. Carllee v. Ellsberry, 82 Ark. 209, 101 S. W. 407, 12
L. R. A. (N. s.) 956 (1907).
22 The West Virginia provision EW. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, §
15), has of course been in force for decades. Many will agree with Judge
Kenna's observation in the present case (118 W. Va. 227, 245), "For most
practical purposes, this discrimination at this time and in this state is not
important."
23118 W. Va. 227, 190 S. E. 697 (1937).
24Item IV of the will reads as follows:
"I give unto Paul Brookover, infant, great-grandson, grand-son of Frances
Martin, deceased, wife of Ben Martin, of Minnie, West Virginia, the following
real estate: Thirty-three and 1-3 (33 1-3) acres, more or less, on the head
waters of Turkey Run, purchased from John Chaplin; Seventy-seven (77)
4
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within the family, - no doubt, - he then provided that if his
great-grandson were eventually to die without issue and leave a
widow, this widow would take a life estate,2" the property thereafter
going over to his (the testator's) two surviving daughters, - or
their respective heirs, - and to the heirs of his deceased son. The
son-in-law life tenant died in 1925, less than two years after the
testator's death. Then, in 1928, the great-grandson beneficiary
died, only eighteen years of age, - unmarried and without issue, -
leaving his father surviving as sole heir at law.28 Suit was later
filed for construction of the wi]l,27 the contest lying between the
gift-over men and the great-grandson's heir at law. Of course,
when these events took place one after another, the contingency
mentioned by the testator, (namely, the great-grandson's death
married but without issue), had never really happened; so on these
facts, naturally, the infant's fee was never divested.2  Yet, con-
acres, more or less, on the south side of Big Fishing Creek and one hundred
and Thirty-four (134) acres, more or less, the last two of said tracts pur-
chased from Adam Kuhn. It is my will that the said Ben Martin shall have a
life time interest in the real estate devised to the said Paul Brookover.
IIIf the said Paul Brookover shall die without issue living and leave a widow,
then said widow to have a life time interest in said real estate and at her death,
it is my will, after the death of the said Ben Martin, that the real estate
so devised to the said Paul Brookover shall descend equally to the said Lottie
Grimm or her heirs; Minnie Yoho, or her heirs, and the heirs of Richard T.
Morgan, deceased.
"I reserve all my rights to the coal, oil and gas within and under said
tracts of land."
25 Judge Kenna, in his dissent, has urged that the condition be construed
to read, - "If Paul should die without issue living or leave a widow," (118
W. Va. 249-251), citing Gourdin v. Shrewsbury, 11 S. C. 1 (1877). This seems
a very reasonable construction, particularly in view of the testator's apparent
intent that the land remain in his family, and not pass to Paul's heirs gen-
erally. On the other hand, the testator has elsewhere in the will, (Items V, VI
and VII), more precisely expressed the condition in other language, - the
inference here being that he did not desire to split the condition in Item IV.
Moreover, the weight of common law authority precludes splitting the con-
tingencies on these facts, Proctor v. Bishop of Bath and Wells, 2 H. BI. 358
(1794).
20 The main issue in Brookover v. Grimm is as to the nature of Paul's es-
tate. If the great-grandson took a fee simple absolute, - either because the
divesting contingency never happened, or because the executory devises to the
gift-over men were barred by the Rule against Perpetuities, - then his father
inherited as the sole heir at law. On the other hand, the testator's other
descendants were urging, as regards Item IV, both that the condition be split
and that the shifting estates vested in timely fashion within the rule.
27 Brookover v. Grimm, 114 W. Va. 701, 174 S. E. 567 (1933), held that the
lower court should contrue these testamentary provisions, under W. VA. REv.
CODE (1931) c. 41, art. 3, § 7.
28 Harrison v. Foreman, 5 Ves. 207 (1800). Of. Jackson v. Noble, 2 Keen.
Ch. 590 (1838).
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struing the will as of the testator's death, the issue before the court
was the original nature and validity of these gifts over.2
The rule of medieval law forbade any limitation after convey-
ance in fee simple. So neither the life estate to an eventual widow
of the great-grandson nor the gifts over thereafter may possibly
take effect as remainders. A limitation of any sort after the vested
fee in the infant beneficiary can only create a shifting interest.
Both the widow's share and ultimate gifts must therefore be execu-
tory devises, 0 and the state of the title becomes:
To the son-in-law for life, the estate in possession; vested
remainder to the great-grandson in fee simple; subject to a
conditional limitation by way of shifting executory devise in
favor of the great-grandson's widow for life, - in the event
he die without issue and leave such widow; and subject,
further, to a shifting executory devise, on the same contingency,
(after the widow's life estate), to the following as tenants in
common in fee simple absolute:
1. Daughter A or her heirs.
2. Daughter B or her heirs.
3. To the heirs of deceased son C.
Such, then, was the involved ownership devised by the testator,
when the will was offered for probate in 1923.
Assuming, however, the great-grandson were in the future to
have died without issue, leaving a widow, it is essential to note
that these future interests would have been greatly modified. Upon
the contingency happening, the widow might have had her life
estate vested in possession or remainder, - depending on whether
or not the testator's son-in-law had predeceased the great-grandson.
In either event, the executory devise in fee to the tenants in com-
mon would have turned into a remainder in fee, after the widow's
holding.3 ' It is essential to understand clearly this uncommon
transformation of the executory devise into a common law future
29 The case is not altogether academic as to Item IV, for there was a good
chance that the court might split the condition and allow the gift-over men to
take, if their executory devises were not too remote. In any event, what hap-
pened later was immaterial as regards the original validity of the provisions,
when the will took effect.
so That is to say, - in 1923, Paul, the great-grandson, had the vested re-
mainder in fee. The contingent life estate to Paul's widow obviously over-
lapped, and was thus an executory devise. Similarly, the gifts to A, B and the
heirs of C overlapped Paul's fee in 1923, and had to be use estates accord-
ingly. As long as Paul had the fee, there could be no remainders.
al GRAY, THE RULE AGAnMlST PERPESurnEs 94, n. 4, citing Craig v. Stacey,
Ir. Term R. 249, and Sturrs v. Burgess, 29 R. I. 269, 275, 67 At 731 (1907).
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estate.3 2 Normally, when the condition is performed, the shifting
use vests in possession instead of continuing on as a future interest
and becoming as here, by a sort of metamorphosis, the ordinary
sort of remainder. The executory devise as ultimately a remainder
is not unusual, but simply rather infrequent.
Thus, when the contingency is fulfilled, the state of the title
changes to, -
Life estate in the great-grandson's widow; remainder as
respective undivided one-third interests in fee to, -
1. Daughter A or her heirs.
2. Daughter B or her heirs.
3. To the heirs of deceased son C.
There would be left merely the characterization of these interests
in remainder as being vested or contingent, - to finish with the
job of construing the will.
In West Virginia,33 the law seems in the main3 4 to be settled
that the disjunctive testamentary word "or" indicates contingency
in a future interest. It is merely a rule of construction, not a rule
of property. If land be given to a life tenant and thereafter in fee
to several tenants in common or their heirs, contingent remainders
only are created. According to Judge Brannon, 35 the reason is
that the heirs take as purchasers rather than by descent. In other
words, it seems there is a contingent remainder in fee to the named
beneficiary, on the condition that he survive the life tenant, with
an alternative contingent remainder in his heirs otherwise, -
32 It should be noted that in states where contingent remainders are still
destructible, this becomes extremely important. Executory devises may, by
the happening of events afterwards, change into contingent remainders: and
thereafter be destroyed by the failure of the preceding freehold before the
occurrence of the contingency upon which these are to take effect in possession.
Doe d. Harris v. Howell, 10 B. & C. 191 (1829).
33 Schaeffer v. Schaefler, 54 W. Va. 681, 46 S. E. 150 (1903) ; approved in
Dent v. Pickens, 61 W. Va. 488, 503, 505, 58 S. E. 1029 (1907), and in Neal v.
Hamilton Co., 70 W. Va. 250, 260, 73 S. E. 971 (1912).
34 In Bland v. Davisson, 77 W. Va. 557, 562, 88 S. E. 1021 (1916), the
limitation read, -I "To my widow Drusilla for life; and then to my grandson
Charles or the children of his body." Held, - the remainder vested at the
death of the testator, there being merely a postponement of enjoyment until
the widow's death. The court quoted, at. p. 561, - 1' -Courts always favor the
vesting of estates, and therefore, in doubtful cases, lean in favor of construing
language as creating vested rather than contingent remainders.2 " As to the
Schaeffer case, (54 W. Va. 681, 46 S. E. 150 (1903), - "it was not be-
lieved that the cases were similar," (p. 562).
35 54 W. Va. 681, 685, 46 S. E. 150 (1903).
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analogous to contingent remainders in double aspect.8 8 Applying
the rule to the limitations above, the interests of the daughters
would have been contingent on their surviving the great-grandson's
widow. As to heirs of the testator's deceased son, the limitation
might be either vested or contingent, depending whether these were
to be ascertained as of the testator's death or ascertained on the
death of the great-grandson's widow, the life tenant. Presumably,
if the other two-thirds do not vest until the latter date, the son's
heirs must be similarly treated. Granted this approach to the prob-
lem, there would be, (as to the respective undivided one-third in-
terests in fee), contingent remainders in A and B, or their heirs,
with a contingent remainder of the same sort in the heirs of 0.
The trouble with the theory of contingent remainders is that
it is simply half the story: it is just one of two equally tenable
hypotheses. Even though the West Virginia cases do have a slant
in favor of contingent remainders,sr - all things being equal, -
the presumption in favor of vesting38 should be given due consider-
ation. There is no good reason of social policy why the remainders
to the daughters A and B, or their heirs, should not vest in interest,
on the death of the great-grandson leaving a widow, - or on the
deaths of A and B. Nor, by the same token, is there any compel-
ling argument against holding that the heirs of the deceased son C
are those alive when the will took effect. As a matter of construc-
tion, the technical rule as to ascertaining heirs would favor early
vesting. 9 If such a method were adopted, these remainders must
all vest when the fee in the great-grandson shifted over, or when
the daughters died.
To sum up then, there are two equally reasonable constructions
as to the fate of the executory devises here:
1. Life estate in the widow; remainders in A or her heirs,
B or her heirs, and the heirs of 0, these contingent remainders
vesting on the death of the widow life tenant.
36 Cf. Loddington v. Xime, 1 Salk. 224 (1695), to the effect that no limitation
after a contingent remainder in fee absolute can be vested. See Edmiston v.
Donovan, 300 I1. 521, 133 N. E. 237 (1921).37 For an illustration of this see Davis Trust Co. v. Elkins, 114 W. Va. 742,
175 S. E. 611 (1934); discussed in The Davis Will Case (1935) 41 W. VA.
L. Q. 385.
3 Duffield v. Duffield, 1 Dow & 0. 268 (1827), per Lord Eldon, L. 0. See,
also, the quotation from Bland v. Davisson, 77 W. Va. 557, 88 S. E. 1021
(1916).
39 The Massachusetts rule, typical of American common law, is illustrated
by Old Colonial Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 268 Mass. 318, 167 N. E. 648 (1929).
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2. Life estate in the widow; remainders, as before, which
must vest in interest not later than the death of the great-
grandson, or, - as to the alternative limitations favoring the
respective heirs of A and B, - not later than the deaths of
A and B.
As the legal anatomist dissects all the various limitations of Book-
over v. Grimm, he must sooner or later choose one of those two
constructions, in determining whether the executory devises are
perpetuities.
PERPETUITIES
Every executory devise, it has been suggested, "is a perpetuity
as far as it goes: that is to say, an estate inalienable, though all
mankind join in the conveyance.' Indeed, the link between
executory devises and perpetuities seems nearly always to have been
before the minds of judges of sixteenth and seventeenth century
England. Historically, again, there was much to be said for such
an apprehension, even apart from the latent judicial dislike of shift-
ing estates (that has never wholly abated). The term perpetuity
had once upon a time been applied to the estate tail conveyed sub-
ject to forfeiture if effort were made to dock the entail.4 Corbet's
Case42 was the answer of the judges to such a scheme: curiously
enough, the condition was held invalid as "repugnant". On an-
other occasion, the scheme had been tried of creating perpetuities in
the guise of a series of inalienable contingent remainders, manu-
factured out of the machinery of the Statute of Uses. 43 These were
all held destructible in Chudleigh's Case,44 - "commonly called
the Case of Perpetuities", - and the danger of any such in-
destructible remainders thus averted. Finally, in Child v. Baylie,
4
'
the court had been presented with the "devise" of a long term for
years, with a gift over if the first taker died without issue living at
his death. This was most improperly considered an entail of a
term46 and accordingly bad: "and if the law will not suffer such
40 Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229 (1699).
41 Bacon, Essay on the 'Use of the Law (1629) 7 BAco'S WoRxS (Sped-
ding's ed.) 491.
421 Co. 83b (1599).
43 GRAY, TnE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 123-124.
441 Co. 120a (1594).
4r Cro. Jac. 459 (1618, 1623).
46 On the score of remoteness, the gift was surely good, for it would vest on
the death of the first taker, a life in being. As to its being an entail, there
was absent any general failure of issue in the shifting estate. The court
9
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perpetuities of inheritances, 47 then much less will it suffer per-
petuities of chattels" real. These judicial speculations had none
of the vagueness characteristic of modern legal philosophy, though
their style was open to an accusation of harshness. What was for-
bidden was the inalienable indestructible future interest: with
great industry the judiciary ferreted out endeavors to slip these
by.48
When executory devises had been found indestructible," limits
on them had to be set at once, or the polity of two centuries over-
thrown. The Duke of Norkfolk's Case 0 temporarily confined the
frontiers of the executory estates within the concept of "lives in
being."
"So is the compass of a life or lives; for let the lives be
never so many, there must be a survivor, and so it is but the
length of that life; for Twisden used to say, the candles were
all lighted at once." 51
"There are bounds set to them, viz., a life or lives in being:
and further they shall never go. . . . at law, let Chancery do
as they please. '152
Gradually, over the period of a century and a half, these boundaries
were extended, until the Rule against Perpetuities was cast into
its modern form of lives in being and twenty-one years. "Executory
devises were in themselves infringements on the rule of the common
law, and were allowed only on condition of their not exceeding
these established limits." To such an extent at least, the
prejudices of the older common law had prevailed. The rule be-
came a weapon to be applied remorselessly. 4
merely looked at the character of the contingency. The judges suspected
an entail was possible in some fashion or other, so they held the gift bad, just
on general principles.
47 While the case of Child v. Bayie was pending on appeal, Pells v. Brown,
Oro. Jae. 590 (1620), sustained the validity of this same limitation as applied
to fees simple. Despite that fact, the Exchequer Chamber affirmed, because
of "the mischief which otherwise would ensue, if there should be such a per-
petuity of a term."
48 This was true, in at least a dozen instances, during the period before the
Duke of Norfolk's Case (1682).
49 Pels v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590 (1620).
50 3 Ch. Cas 1 (1682).
W. Per Powell, J., in Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229 (1699).
52 Per Treby, C. J., in Scatterwood v. Edge, 12 Mod. 287 (1699).
53 Similarly, "it is an established rule that an executory devise is good if
it must necessarily happen within" limits: per Kenyon, C. J., in Long v. Black-
all, 7 T. R. 100, 102 (1797).
'4 Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W. Va. 398 (syl. 2), 113 S. E. 256 (1922).
10
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The Rule against Perpetuities like many another legal precept
offers the unpleasant surprise of explaining its purpose by impli-
cation and allusion. Perhaps just as the Rule in Shelley's Case,
its purpose has varied from age to age." Anyway, perpetuities
were originally indestructible future interests which offended
against judicial preference for common law estates of the simpler
and more fragile nature. Executory devises, as an evil in and of
themselves, prompted courts to invent a method for their liquid-
ation. When the period of historical development had flowered, a
newer generation of analytical jurists sought to spell out a more
logical basis. Disregarding the former hostility towards executory
devises, these nineteenth century scholars established firmly the
rule against remoteness, even though troublesome cases occasionally
did not quite jibe with their theory.58
Now, under present-day influence of realist jurisprudence, 57
the terminology changes into "a rule against indirect restraints on
alienation." "Whatever may be the immediate objective" of the
Rule against Perpetuities, so it is said, the "ultimate purpose is to
prevent tying up of property. '"5 s This assumes inevitably a "policy
of the law in favor of the free alienability of most types of interests
in land.' "59 The difficulty with the assumption is that courts have
seldom followed consistently any such policy, - at least, not very
long. Legal historians realize that judges, and not the Statute de
Donis, created the indestructible fee tail. 0 The sole and separate
estate of the married woman was chancery's eighteenth century dis-
covery." Spendthrift trusts, moreover, and contemporaneous post-
GG Originally, the Rule in Shelley's Case was intended to protect feudal lords
against serious loss through conveyances in derogation of feudal rights,
(PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1936) 504-5).
Later, its accepted basis became the theory that contingent remainders were
invalid in the early common law. In modern times, the rationale of the Rule
has been free alienability of the land.
68 In other words, there are many remote estates which are valid. For ex-
ample, remote vested remainders, remote rights of reverter, and remote gifts
over from one charity to another are all good perpetuities.
5 See Pound, The Call for a 1Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L.
REV. 697.
58 2 SIMES, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) 343. Cf. 1XALES, FUTURE
INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS 114: "The Rule against Perpetuities should be care-
fully distinguished at all times from the rules making void restraints on
alienation. There are two different principles of public policy involved and
each finds expression in a different rule."
59 2 SlIES, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTS 269.
6O PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Comw0N LAW 494-496.
63 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) 711; 2 id. at 760.
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ponement of enjoyment of the vested equitable fee 2 scarcely typify
freedom of alienation. The ready answer is that there is constant
and continuous conflict between "control of property by the
dead" '6 and the assumed policy in favor of free alienation: the
result is then make-shift compromise rather than clear legal princi-
ple. So without some understanding of the origin and develop-
ment of the Rule, there is always difficulty in its application."
The limitations in Brookover v. Grimm must be approached
from this angle, in any effort to ascertain whether they are fairly
"within the law". Since the doctrine of "repugnancy" is not
often found in recent West Virginia decisions,1 the problem is
wholly one of perpetuities. Naturally there can be no question
about the great-grandson's vested remainder in fee, following the
life estate in possession given the son-in-law: it is doubt as to
validity of the executory devises that raises the issue. So far as
the shifting devise given the great-grandson's possible widow is in-
volved, this must vest (if at all) on his death, - and he is the
necessary life in being immediately preceding her estate's taking
effect in possession. Her interest is of course valid. Disposition of
the fee on the widow's death was what concerned the court."6
Superficially, the ultimate gifts over would appear too remote.
These were not to vest in possession until termination of the
widow's prior executory devise; and possibly, - quite possibly (for
the great-grandson was then but thirteen), - the widow would
have been a life unborn at the testator's death. 7  As a matter of
fact, the majority opinion did hold these too remote. 8 Still such
an issue deserves further study. Common law courts strike down
merely the contingent future estates, and not the vested ones. The
rule itself recognizes that an executory devise may within limits
62 Cf. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889).
63 Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (1917) 65 U. oF PA. L. REv.
527, 632.
64 Witness the difficulties courts have encountered in dealing with options
to purchase the fee.
65 Bartlett v. Petty, 93 W. Va 608, 117 S. E. 551 (1923).
66 That is to say, - assuming the contingency were split so that the only
issue were the remoteness of the executory devises.
67 Easton v. Hall, 323 Ill. 397, 154 N. E. 216 (1926).
68 The court said, (118 W. Va. 234): "It was altogether possible that he
might in manhood marry a woman not in being at the testator's death, and
that she would become Paul's widow. In that contingency, the ultimate vest-
ing of the estate would be postponed on account of a life not in being at the
testator's death. Clearly, under the authorities stated above, the executory
limitation is void."
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vest in interest, even if not in possession. No doubt the exception
is unsound as a matter of cold metallic reasoning. The vested re-
mainder after a long-term lease may be equally objectionable,6 9
compared with the springing use which is to vest in possession on
the same remote future day. Historically, however, the executory
limitation (which permanently remained such) was the one the
older law disliked and feared. The enquiry here should be to find
whether any of the final limitations will necessarily vest in interest
within the rule.
It has been indicated above that there are two possible con-
structions as to the nature of these remainders. On the one hand,
the ultimate gifts over may become contingent remainders, vesting
finally on the death of the (possibly unborn) widow life tenant. As
such, these are bad: later development of the rule swept contingent
remainders within its ken.7 0  If that were all, there would be no
further chance for these beneficiaries. On the other hand, the alter-
native construction noted permits the limitations to vest in interest
within the rule, either
1. As to the remainders to A and B, - not later than the
death of the great-grandson, a life in being; or
2. As to the alternative gifts to the heirs of A and B,
not later than the deaths of A and B, who are lives in being.
("Heirs" ordinarily comprehends those entitled to the bene-
ficiary's property upon his death.)
In short, - assuming the gift to the heirs of C has the same con-
struction as the remaining two-thirds, - the executory devises con-
not be invalid. They must vest, if at all, within lives in being.
What reasons should determine the choice between these alter-
native constructions? One might suggest several considerations. In
the first place, the West Virginia doctrine as to use of the dis-
junctive "or" might be applied, if the precedents are to be given
any weight. Yet surely the cases are distinguishable: their hold-
ing merely favors postponed vesting, without laying down any pre-
cise rule as to when vesting will eventually occur. Again, it may
be argued that the language "A or 7ter heirs" indicates those per-
sons who would have been the daughter's heirs, if ascertained at the
death of the unborn widow. Thus "heirs" would have a special
meaning, - not the ordinary one, - so that vesting could be held
69 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINsT PERPETUITIES 662-663.70In re Ashworth, L. R. [1905] 1 Ch. 535.
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up till the widow died. There is no indication in the majority
opinion that this departure from the ordinary meaning of "heirs"
was considered, and no substantial justification for making it.71
Finally, there is the historical prejudice of the courts against execu-
tory devises; and this is perhaps the most important consideration.
If these limitations were once so disliked and feared, - if the rule
is to be applied remorselessly, - if the doubtful case is to be re-
solved against the validity of the interest given, - then it is readily
evident that the result must follow of striking down these executory
devises as perpetuities.
It is equally difficult to conclude that the second construction,
(the one favorable to early vesting), is beyond doubt the correct
one. True enough, the testamentary language here, - "at her
death", - may be disregarded as surplusage: probably its meaning
is only, - "subject to the widow's life interest, to A or her heirs. 1 72
Still the testator consistently employed language that has a forward
look to it: the provisions are all in the future tense.7 3 Moreover,
the presumption in favor of vesting is so frequently disregarded in
this day and age that one might consider it as a somewhat weak
sort of inference, easily rebutted. Indeed, one could almost sug-
gest that it is merely synonymous with the result reached. If a
certain future interest is held vested, then the case will be decided
on the basis of the presumption: if on the same limitations the
result is a contingent remainder, then the ratio decidendi is the
condition precedent.7 4  Actually, in these instances, other factors
have dictated whichever construction the jurist has reached. It
may be urged that the complicated distribution desired by the
testator should be given effect, if at all possible, so that the property
71 The court merely observed, -I "It provides that if Paul shall die without
living issue and leave a widow, she shall have a life estate, the remainder
thereafter to become vested in persons to be determined at the widow Is death.'
The postponement of ascertainment of heirs is justified only in extreme cases,
where the testamentary language or other facts clearly require it. See (1934)
40 W. VA. L. Q. 385; Leach, 2'erpetuities in a Nutshell (1938) 51 HAV. L.
REV. 638, 647.
72 Maddison v. Chapman, 4 K & J. 709, 719 (1858); In re Shuckburgh's
Settlement [1901] 2 Oh. 794.
73The provision uses "shall" three times. The gift over is "at" the
widow's death, and "after" the death of the son-in-law, life tenant in
possession.
74 Just as a statute may be liberally construed as being remedial or the
same law narrowly construed as being "in derogation of the common law":
the result gives the name to the reason.
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remain on in his family.7 5 But even that reasoning proves too
much: one must not write a new will, to save these limitations.
And, in any event, there is the old common law dislike of remote
executory devises.
Nevertheless, the contention in support of the testator's testa-
mentary provision does have some merit. Conceded that the two
possible constructions are evenly balanced, it is reasonable to be-
lieve the testator meant to create a legal rather than an illegal
interest. It is true the Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of con-
struction, - and that the will must ordinarily be construed as if
the problem of perpetuities did not exist. But "when the ex-
pression . . . is really ambiguous and fairly capable of two con-
structions, one of which would produce a legal result and the other
a result that would be bad for remoteness", "there is a legitimate
use of the Rule.' '7 Such an approach could save the limitations
here, even though these be executory use estates and not traditional
common law remainders. It must accordingly be regretted that this
reasoning was not proposed in the briefs of counsel, so that the
court might have had the benefit of argument in construing the
testator's intent as to vesting.77 One may speculate that perhaps
the case would in that event have gone the other way.
Brookover v. Griimm has answered in able fashion many vexing
phases of the lore surrounding executory devises. Apart from its
central theme of remote executory devises, there is discussion of the
doctrine of separable limitations,7 8 - of the question of "fettering
75 One must bear in mind that the decision in Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, (enun-
ciating the rule of construction for the disjunctive "or"), did not settle
whether survivorship in a will related to the death of the testator, or to some
other point of time. Prichard v. Prichard, 83 W. Va. 652, 655, 98 S. E. 877
(1919). By postponing vesting until the latest possible time, - the death
of Paul's widow, - the gifts over become bad. Paul thus takes an absolute
fee, which passes to his father, as heir at law. Paul's father not being a
descendant of the testator, the property then goes out of the family. The
choice here is apparently between the testator's descendants, (expressly named
as beneficiaries), and one who is not related by blood.
76 GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 499.
77 The briefs of counsel are silent in this respect. The case was argued
Jan. 26, 1937, and decided Feb. 9, 1937. Plainly, in the preparation of
such an elaborate opinion by the court, there would be little opportunity for
independent investigation.
78 Judge Maxwell cites with approval Longhead v. Phelps, 2 W. BI. 704
(1771), which is a leading anthority on separable limitations. Its doctrine
is, briefly, that the court will give effect to the good part of a divesting con-
dition, if the testator has divided the contingencies. Unless the testator has
himself done so, the court will seldom, if ever, do the splitting for him. This
rule as to divided contingencies is often overlooked. Cf. McCreery v. John-
ston, 90 W. Va. 80, 110 S. E. 464 (1922).
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the condition'",79 - and of the common law principle of repugnancy
where the first taker has a power of consumption, with a gift over
of the balance left.8 0 Its decision serves to clarify West Virginia
law on these points. Gradually local doctrines in the field of future
interests are being settled by the court. There is no indication,
however, that legal history can ever be excluded from legal theory
as to executory devises.
C. C. WLAMS, JR.
79 The issue is, - does "die without issue" mean "Idie without issue in the
life-tiMe of the testator?" Should the condition thus be "fettered"?
O'Mahoney v. Burdett, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. Cas. 388 (1874) holds not.
See Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without Issue (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 346.
so National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S. E. 291, 36 A. L. PI
1171 (1924). The common law doctrine is modified by W. VA. Rsv. CODE
(1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 16.
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